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ABSTRACT 
 Coactive Design is a process that addresses the increasingly complex roles that 
humans and robots play in modern digitalized systems. It analyzes the interdependencies 
between members in human-robot teamwork and optimizes interactive collaboration to 
support the team’s overall capabilities. The process endeavors to provide designers and 
industry players with the necessary analysis tools and techniques to move the industry 
away from robot-centric automation in which the traditional goal has been for robots to 
perform required tasks independently from the team. 
 The two outcomes of this thesis are (1) the proposal of an integrated Coactive 
Systems Engineering Design (COSEED) framework to guide the development of more 
effective human-machine teaming (HMT) systems and (2) a development exercise for an 
HMT system to demonstrate the potential gains from the incorporation of the Coactive 
Design approach into the well-established systems engineering process in the field of 
inland search and rescue. These result in new findings in how both systems engineering 
and Coactive Design could be adapted to better complement each other. 
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The evolution of engineering systems has led to a nexus point for independent task 
performance from machines, resulting in the realization of a lack of collaborative analysis 
tools that guide the design of human-machine teaming (HMT) systems. As such, this thesis 
sets out not just to combine, but also to integrate two engineering design and development 
processes: the well-established and heavily utilized Systems Engineering Process, and a 
relatively new but increasingly important Coactive Design process, which categorizes 
interdependence requirements of observability, predictability, and directability (OPD) 
(Johnson 2014) between machines and includes robots, artificial intelligence agents and 
software, and their human operators. 
This thesis offers an integrated Coactive Systems Engineering Design (COSEED) 
process that aims to propel HMT systems to the next level of capabilities through 
interdependence analysis and model-based systems engineering (MBSE). This process is 
demonstrated in a Search and Rescue (SAR) HMT development exercise to show how a 
small team of agents working as part of an HMT can accomplish a wider range of tasks as 
compared to traditional SAR techniques. 
By integrating the relatively new Coactive Design approach into the well-
established and globally utilized Systems Engineering Process, future needs can be better 
addressed as automated and unmanned systems become more capable and amalgamated in 
both commercial and military operations across different domains. This should then be 
expanded to any field of study in which human operators work together with single or 
multiple unmanned and intelligent systems, to maximize the benefits from the investment 
and workspace outcomes. 
A condensed SAR system development exercise to demonstrate the integration of 
coactive design with systems engineering into the COSEED process focused on the 
requirements and interdependencies of a SAR HMT system. This includes an unmanned 
solution that can respond to emergency situations and provide a range of capabilities to 
xviii 
extend the reach of a conventional SAR team, which typically consists of manned aircraft, 
off-road vehicles, park rangers and volunteers.  
An Interdependence Analysis table (Johnson 2014) is prepared as part of the 
development exercise to study the potential interdependencies within the HMT system. 
This produces OPD requirements which help designers better understand the internal 
support structure that the agents require when they interact within the system, as they 
dictate what the system and sub-systems would need to provide the human operator and 
what assistance the human operator can offer to the system to accomplish its assigned tasks. 
The Department of Defense’s MBSE framework, known as Department of Defense 
Architecture Framework (DoDAF), and other design analysis tools such as the Pugh Matrix 
and Morphological Analysis are utilized in the exercise to illustrate systems engineering 
concepts. 
The outcome of the development exercise is a set of interdependence requirements 
that guide how an unmanned aerial system (UAS), consisting of a command and control 
(C2) module and three types of UAVs, to perform search along a pre-defined route, audio 
communication with the casualty, and supply delivery roles, respectively, with geo-
locating performed via Global Positioning Satellites (GPSs). The operational concept of 
the SAR UAS is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Operational Concept for SAR HMT UAS System 
xix 
The development exercise gave rise to the following findings and 
recommendations. First, coactive design is an effective enabler for HMT system 
development within a systems engineering framework. Second, the iterative nature of the 
COSEED process can influence the Systems Engineering Vee model to be more 
representative of the realities of system design and requirement management.  
Third, the systems engineering community should consider adaptations to the 
DoDAF MBSE framework to be more inclusive of HMT systems, and the coactive design 
community should study alternatives for the IA table color scheme to accommodate users 
with color vision deficiencies, and incorporate an additional column in the IA table to 
capture the required specification of that capacity, which would aid designers in 
determining the agents’ ability to perform and support tasks. 
Finally, the SAR community should continue to exploit unmanned technologies in 
which the COSEED process can provide a guide for holistic development of optimized 
solutions to expand current capacities and reach of its services to increase rates of detection, 
which can help to save lives. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As engineering systems become increasingly complex, they eventually reach a 
nexus point in which the machine is unable to perform at optimum capacity without 
additional assistance or support from its peers or human operators. This has led to the 
identification of a lack of collaborative analysis tools that guide the design of human-
machine teaming (HMT) systems. As such, this thesis sets out not just to combine, but also 
to integrate two engineering design and development processes: the well-established and 
heavily utilized Systems Engineering Process, and a relatively new but increasingly 
important Coactive Design process, which categorizes interdependence requirements 
between machines, which includes robots, and artificial intelligence agents and software, 
and their human operators. 
A. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT  
1. Effectiveness of Automated Capabilities 
Traditionally, robots operate independently based off a pre-defined set of 
parameters and with repeated tasks in a confined workspace with known boundaries. 
Ongoing research has mainly focused on the integration of tried and tested technologies to 
supplement existing operations (Waharte and Trigoni 2010; Półka et al. 2018). However, 
the truly successful integration of such systems with their operators needs to be influenced 
early in the conceptualization and design stages, only then would the system be able to 
reach its full potential through interdependent collaboration between groups of human 
operators and machines (Johnson 2014) 
2. Increasing Occurrences and Scale of Natural Disasters 
The frequency and ferocity of large-scale natural disasters have been increasing 
since the early 1990s (Yale Environment 360 2020) due to a multitude of factors, including 
man-made circumstances. The incidence of such widespread disasters in densely populated 
areas with extensive infrastructure means that each natural disaster renders many members 
of the community cut off from rescue and essential supplies. Therefore, there is a need for 
2 
SAR systems that can both address a range of disaster relief operations and operate in 
disaster zones with limited operational infrastructure.  
3. Expansion in Search and Rescue Capabilities 
The developments and commercialization of Global Positioning Systems (GPSs), 
drone technology and its application in HMT and augmented reality (AR) continue to drive 
the technological capabilities built into search and rescue (SAR) operations. As these 
capabilities increase, the speed at which casualties can be found and attended to within the 
“golden hour” would increase survivability rates (Pierobon 2020). The continuing growth 
in this area gives rise to the prospect of even shorter response times and higher survival 
rates, which makes it worth further exploration and improvement.  
The problem statement I will address is how the Systems Engineering Process can 
be improved to better suit the design and development of HMT in a system-of-systems 
environment to enhance usability and maximize the capability of the interactions while 
minimizing the trade-offs brought about by integration. 
B. THESIS STATEMENT 
This thesis will offer an integrated Coactive Systems Engineering Design 
(COSEED) process that aims to propel HMT systems to the next level of capabilities 
through interdependence analysis and model-based systems engineering (MBSE). This 
proposed process would be demonstrated in a search and rescue (SAR) HMT development 
exercise to show how a small team of agents working as part of an HMT can accomplish a 
wider range of tasks as compared to traditional SAR techniques. 
C. RESEARCH METHOD 
Both systems engineering and coactive design processes will be analyzed to 
identify gaps in which the system design elements derived from coactive design can be 
incorporated to provide the envisioned benefits to HMT systems. The workflow would then 
be executed through a product development process for a specific SAR operation which 
requires HMT. This would then lead on to an analysis of the new COSEED process, 
3 
identifying new ways to integrate Coactive Design and the Systems Engineering Vee 
approach and subsequently leading to recommendations for future research in the area.  
D. THESIS OUTLINE 
The integration of the Systems Engineering Process and Coactive Design Method 
merges preceding works by Buede, Blanchard and Fabrycky, and Langford as modern 
practitioners of systems engineering, and Johnson as the creator of Coactive Design. 
Chapter II explores their works in greater detail. 
Chapter III provides an in-depth description of the research method, followed by 
Chapters IV and V, which present the results from the COSEED development exercise and 
offer an analysis of the derived outcomes, respectively. Chapter VI concludes this thesis 
and proposes recommendations for follow-on research. 
E. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THESIS RESEARCH 
By integrating the relatively new Coactive Design into the well-established and 
globally utilized Systems Engineering Process, this thesis aims to better address future 
needs as automated and unmanned systems become more capable and amalgamated in both 
commercial and military operations across different domains. This should then be 
expanded to any field of study in which human operators work together with single or 
multiple unmanned and intelligent systems, to maximize the benefits from the investment 
and workspace outcomes. The Navy, DOD and systems engineering community would 
stand to benefit from this enhanced COSEED process for HMT systems. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has highlighted the proliferation of new unmanned systems and the 
need for better human-machine integration into next generation system-of-systems as the 
motivation for this thesis. The objectives and outline for the thesis, and anticipated benefits 
from the research findings have also been presented. 
  
4 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
5 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING MODEL  
1. Overview 
Systems engineering as a concept started out in the early 1900s before it was 
consolidated and coined as such by Bell Telephone Laboratories in the early 1940s. Its 
popularity and standing increased after extensive use during and immediately after World 
War II as more complex systems started being developed (Buede 2009).  
Blanchard and Fabrycky (2014) define a system as a set of components that have 
attributes and relationships that together performs a suite of functions that leads towards 
the achievement of a set of objectives. They also note that relationships can be 
characterized as first-order, which represents a functional necessity such as a light switch 
to close a circuit so that electricity is supplied to a bulb to turn it on, or as second-order, 
which is complementary in nature and adds to system performance, such as a turbocharger 
in a combustion engine, in which the combustion engine is fully capable of performing its 
key function of converting energy stored in fuel to a mechanical output on its own, but the 
complementary turbocharger increases the amount of power output for the same amount of 
material input. 
The following sections will present the Systems Engineering Vee model as the 
overarching system development workflow, Systems Modelling Language (SysML) and 
model-based systems engineering (MBSE) as a framework to communicate the artifacts of 
the Systems Engineering Process, and the Department of Defense Architecture Framework 
(DoDAF) as an agreed upon set of views into the functional grouping of those artifacts. 
2. Systems Engineering Vee Model 
Apart from decomposing a system, the Systems Engineering Process also looks at 
a system’s life cycle and decomposes it to distinctive stages, starting from its 
conceptualization and design at one end all the way until its retirement and disposal at the 
other end. This cradle-to-grave view of a system is summarized in the classic Systems 
6 
Engineering Vee model, which is shown in Figure 1. Buede (2009) describes the left side 
of the Vee as the decomposition side, which covers the evolution of the system from an 
operational need, which is where the Needs Assessment takes place, to system-level 
requirements to component-specific technical specifications at the Subsystem 
Requirements phase. Here the system architecture and overall vision of how the system 
would function to achieve its objective would be transferred from pen to paper and 
developed in great detail to prepare for integration and validation, which takes place on the 
right side of the Vee. Verification and Validation take place near the top right corner of the 
model and are important steps to ensure that the system was built according to 
specifications to perform its functions within the required standards, while also meeting 
the operational needs put forth by the stakeholders.  
 
Figure 1. Systems Engineering Vee Model. Source: Langford (2009). 
3. Model-Based Systems Engineering and Systems Modeling Language 
As systems evolved with increasing complexity which required the involvement of 
a growing number of stakeholders from different entities with different backgrounds and 
levels of understanding, there became a need to simplify the way in which project-specific 
systems engineering concepts and processes were explained and distributed to the various 
stakeholders. MBSE was developed to directly address this need and enabled the transition 
from a tedious document-centric process to an efficient and easy to digest model-centric 
7 
process which offers non-engineering-based stakeholders with a theoretically more 
straightforward graphical interpretation of information pertaining to the systems 
engineering process to facilitate understanding and aid in decision making (Hart 2015).  
The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) described MBSE as 
the “formalized application of modeling to support system requirements, design, analysis, 
verification, and validation activities beginning in the conceptual design phase and 
continuing throughout development and later life cycle phases” (INCOSE 2007, 15). It 
relies primarily on the use of computer-based tools as a platform for the generation of 
models to promote a shared understanding of system requirements and design, assist 
engineers and program managers with the management of complex system development, 
improve design quality and support verification and validation tasks to reduce risk in the 
system’s life cycle (Friedenthal, Moore, and Steiner 2009). 
A popular example of an MBSE graphical modeling language is called SysML, 
which was derived from the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and specifically 
developed for use with systems engineering processes and is described by INCOSE (2007) 
as “a general-purpose graphical modeling language for specifying, designing, analyzing 
and verifying complex systems.” It was developed by the Object Management Group to 
provide a common baseline for engineers and designers to follow when utilizing MBSE. 
An overview of this is shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. SysML Diagram Types. Source: Object Management Group (2009). 
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4. Department of Defense Architecture Framework: 
 The Department of Defense developed the Department of Defense Architecture 
Framework (DoDAF) to capitalize on the benefits of MBSE for the development and 
acquisition of complex systems and also to provide managers with a “comprehensive 
framework and conceptual model enabling the development of architectures to facilitate 
the ability… to make key decisions more effectively through organized information sharing 
across the Department” (Office of the Chief Information Officer 2010b). 
Several viewpoints exist within the DoDAF Framework, which apportions any 
problem space into manageable pieces and presents “this information in a way that is 
understandable to the many stakeholder communities involved” (Office of the Chief 
Information Officer 2010b). Some examples of these viewpoints are the Operational (OV), 
Systems (SV), and Data and Information (DIV) Viewpoints, in which OV models assist in 
developing the end user’s operational requirements, SV models assign system resources to 
provide functions to meet the identified requirements, and the DIV models portray 
information exchange requirements and structure between entities. 
B. CHALLENGES OF HUMAN-MACHINE TEAMING IN AUTOMATION 
Johnson (2014) noted in his dissertation that over time there had been multiple 
attempts to design systems which enabled more teaming opportunities with their human 
operators through different techniques such as function allocation, supervisory control, 
adaptive automation to name a few, which eventually evolved to the title of cooperative 
robotics. These methods employed different levels of automation depending on the degree 
of autonomy desired from the robots; however, Johnson went on to argue that the concept 
of the levels of autonomy do not adequately address the levels of collaboration and 
interdependence, which will be further elaborated in a later section, between the members 
of a human-machine team. This lack of coverage and consideration results in the 
development of sub-optimized HMT systems in which the human’s workload is not 
effectively reduced, the robot’s abilities are not fully exploited, and a disjointed teaming 
platform exists. 
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1. Research Significance 
Johnson’s findings are significant to this research for a few reasons. First, many 
system designers and developers seem to believe that striving for full autonomy is the 
ultimate design goal and machines can eventually operate with no human oversight  
(Brown 2020). This could be due to knowledge passed down from instructors or superiors, 
simple misinterpretation of requirements, or the pressure from a competitive market. 
However, users should be seeking machines that can be good team mates (Seeber et al. 
2018).  
An example of a good machine team mate comes from Garry Kasparov, the world’s 
leading chess player spanning over two decades who famously lost to IBM’s Big Blue 
chess computer in 1996 (History 2009), who now participates in artificial intelligence 
development and champions the concept of “advanced chess,” in which a human teams up 
with a computer that Kasparov claims to be “mutually beneficial as the human player has 
access to the computer’s ability to calculate moves, while the computer benefits from 
human intuition” (Sollinger 2018, para. 7). 
As current design techniques focus on increasing the autonomy of systems, there is 
little focus on making the machine a good teammate for its human operator. The next 
section outlines the limitations of a sole focus on autonomy, and a possible system 
engineering oriented approach to overcoming the issue is presented following that. 
2. “Levels of Automation” Approach and Shortfalls 
In 1978, Sheridan and Verplank put forth a detailed three-page list of the “Levels 
of Automation in Man-Computer Decision-Making” (8–17), which has been actively cited 
and used in the robotics community to distinguish between the different degrees of 
autonomy that a robot would have in a certain scenario. Parasuraman, Sheridan and 
Wickens (2000) offered a condensed and summarized version, shown in Table 1, of the 
original three-page table from 1978. 
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High 10. The computer decides everything, acts autonomously, ignoring the human. 
 9. The computer informs the human only if it, the computer, decides to. 
 8. The computer informs the human only if asked, or 
 7. The computer executes automatically, then necessarily informs the human, and 
 6. The computer allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic execution, or 
 5. The computer executes that suggestion if the human approves, or 
 4. The computer suggests one alternative 
 3. The computer narrows the selection down to a few, or 
 2. The computer offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives, or 
Low 1. The computer offers no assistance; the human must take all decisions and actions. 
 
The 10 levels listed offer a scale of the level of automation of a computer system, 
in which level 1 represents no assistance being offered by the computer to the human and 
level 10 indicates that the computer system does all the work. While the table makes it 
seem like a straightforward task to assign a certain level of autonomy to a computer system 
as part of a larger solution, Johnson (2014) highlighted that the frequent usage of the 
simplified table of Levels of Automation had over time led users to overlook the original 
intention of Sheridan and Verplank, which was to show a sequential group of events 
between the human and computer for each level of autonomy. Instead, users have mistaken 
the level of autonomy to rest solely on the computer’s role for each task, without 
consideration on how the human can also contribute to autonomy. Johnson (2014) also 
identified several other limitations of the Levels of Autonomy model, as summarized 
below, and are further elaborated in the coming segments. 
1. Functional Differences Matter, 
2. Levels Are Neither Ordinal nor Representative of Value, 
3. Autonomy Is Relative to The Context of The Activity, 
4. Levels Of Autonomy Encourage Reductive Thinking, 
5. The Levels of Autonomy Concept Is Insufficient to Meet Future 
Challenges, and 
6. Levels Provide Insufficient Guidance to The Designer. (30-35) 
a. Functional Differences Matter 
Different tasks require differing levels of interaction between the human and the 
computer. Parasuraman, Sheridan and Wickens (2000) attempted to address the varying 
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degree of teamwork in automation by associating four task-type categories of acquisition, 
analysis, decision, and action with each of the 10 levels of automation. Sheridan and 
Verplank (1978) had already identified the need for differentiation between functions in 
their early work, with a summary of the example of a level 1 task shown in Table 2. This 
reinforces the concept that each functional task would require a different level of 
interaction. 









b. Levels Are Neither Ordinal nor Representative of Value 
The Levels of Autonomy imply that autonomy can be increased in a machine 
incrementally, across all the tasks it is required to do. Johnson (2014) instead contends that 
in practice, autonomy would be applied to varying degrees across the range of sub-tasks 
that a computer system would need to perform while assisting to accomplish a larger task. 
An associated level of autonomy would also depend on the perspective with which 
an observer views the system and the boundaries in which the system is meant to operate, 
both of which are key systems engineering elements. Johnson (2014) further elaborates this 
concept with the example that  
if we redefine the task as something simpler, such as following a road 
without traffic, then we could once again describe the car as fully 
autonomous. In fact, virtually any machine could be considered fully 
autonomous if we define the grain size of its task to be sufficiently small. 
(32) 
This leads on to the next constraint of the Levels of Autonomy. 
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c. Autonomy is Relative to the Context of the Activity 
In their report from 1978, Sheridan and Verplank named their table as the “Levels 
of Automation… for a single elemental decisive step” (8-17). This concept still holds true, 
in which the ability to conduct a pre-defined task independently does not necessarily imply 
that the computer system can conduct all tasks autonomously. Certain tasks such as safety 
critical decision making for example can only be performed by a human, while a computer 
system may be much more efficient and suited for certain tasks such as high-volume 
calculations and handling of large amounts of data. The result of this relationship is the 
roles that the human and computer play while performing a task are means by which their 
capabilities and required interdependence are described (Johnson 2014). 
d. Levels of Autonomy Encourage Reductive Thinking 
The problems described earlier indicate a tendency towards the oversimplification 
of the technicalities involved when there are attempts to introduce autonomy into an 
engineering solution. On top of this, there is “the tendency to view activity as sequential 
when it is actually simultaneous” (Johnson 2014, 33). Teamwork in reality involves 
multiple actors performing their own tasks in their own time and space while interacting 
through the passing and receiving of material or information between each other to 
accomplish the overall goal, much like the members of a basketball team constantly 
moving around the court to gain a spatial advantage and evade their markers so that their 
teammates can pass them the ball for an opportunity to shoot for points. 
Therefore, even though the dependencies for sub-tasks of a system may be dissected 
into a sequential manner, it should not be treated the same way when the interactions and 
interdependencies of the entire system are being developed (Johnson 2014). 
e. The Levels of Autonomy Concept Is Insufficient to Meet Future 
Challenges 
When Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens (2000) proposed their Framework for 
Automation Design, they had implicitly acknowledged that the initial Levels of Autonomy 
concept was inadequate for today’s complex system architectures and had to be integrated 
with how humans process information (i.e., processing, perception, decision making, and 
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response). This process had increased focus on how automated computer systems could aid 
humans in performing their tasks. 
Taking that a step further, an enhanced version of Sheridan and Verplank’s original 
table was developed to enable designers to better consider the collaboration and 
interdependencies between both human and computer team members and is shown in 
Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Level 6 Example of Enhanced Level of Automation. Source: Johnson 
(2014). 
The Level 6 example used was expanded to include the types of information that 
the human and computer might depend on each other to provide to complete their tasks, 
with solid arrows depicting hard constraints, which indicate compulsory data flows for task 
completion, and broken arrows representing soft constraints, which are not vital for 
completing the task but the performer would benefit from having (Johnson 2014). 
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f. Levels Provide Insufficient Guidance to the Designer 
The Levels of Autonomy model offered unmanned system designers an overview 
of the different degrees of autonomy that a computer system could achieve for a certain 
task. It however did not offer guidelines or design principles for designers to follow when 
they constructed or integrated the unmanned systems into a solution (Johnson 2014). 
Questions such as “How can the unmanned system be optimized” and “How can the human 
support the computer’s role?” were left unanswered and designers instead focused on 
building an unmanned system to aid the human and overlooked the system’s potential 
ability “to leverage the human’s ability to improve the overall work system’s effectiveness” 
(Johnson 2014, 36). 
The six identified limitations bring to light the understanding that human-machine 
interface design is not as straightforward as usually interpreted and there remains a gap in 
the study of how both the human and the machine can collaboratively support the human-
machine team to maximize the potential of the unmanned system that is a part of the 
solution instead of the whole solution. With an eye on improving systems engineering 
practices to overcome this shortfall, the goal would be to incorporate a new framework to 
accomplish the design of requirements for appropriate interdependent human machine 
teaming. One such framework is coactive design, which will be introduced in the next 
section.  
C. COACTIVE DESIGN  
To better address the shortfalls in human-machine team design, Johnson (2014) 
introduced Coactive Design with the intention of addressing the “increasingly sophisticated 
roles that people and robots play as the use of robots expands into new, complex domains” 
(43). The term Coactive was selected as it implied the involvement of more than one party 
in the activity in a cooperative manner, and the goal of Coactive Design was characterized 
as guiding designers to “identify interdependent relationships in a joint activity” so that 
“systems that support the relationships” can be designed to “achieve the objectives of 
coordination, collaboration, and teamwork” (Johnson 2014, 43). This was accomplished 
through five contributions which was summarized by Zach as “a fresh design perspective 
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built on interdependence, a more comprehensive understanding of interdependence, a 
model for human-machine systems, a design method, and a new tool to assist with system 
design and analysis called the Interdependence Analysis (IA) Table” (Zach 2016, 16). 
1. Interdependence 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines interdependence as “the state of being 
dependent upon one another” and “a mutually dependent relationship” (Merriam-Webster 
n.d.). To enable HMT, Johnson stated that “understanding the nature of the 
interdependencies among groups of humans and machines provides insight into the kinds 
of coordination that will be required. Indeed, we assert that coordination mechanisms in 
skilled teams arise largely because of such interdependencies” (Johnson 2014, 53). 
Johnson (2014) highlighted that modern-day automation systems are unaware of 
the human participants even though they may have shared responsibilities. This is a result 
of previous work prioritizing the allocation of tasks to robots that may not be aware of the 
team’s goal or “other activities on which its tasks may be interdependent” (Johnson 2014, 
44). The inclusion of a machine’s ability to be aware of its interdependence within a team 
is only beneficial if it allows the machine the opportunity to alter the outcomes at decision 
points, which can only be accomplished when interdependence requirements are properly 
considered during the design phase for such collaborative unmanned robots. This however 
would require a significant leap in the design of both the autonomy and interface aspects 
of robots that were primarily designed to operate independently (Johnson 2014). 
It is therefore imperative that interdependence between team members is properly 
understood to create a successful human-machine team which is fully cognizant of the 
appropriate levels of self-sufficiency and self-directedness at each step of the task they are 
required to perform together to maximize the full potential of the system (Johnson 2014). 
2. Coactive System Model 
Wilcox and Chenoweth (2017) introduced Johnson’s Coactive System Model as 
one which “focuses on the effective and efficient teaming of man-machine systems” (12). 
This is achieved through the matching of team members’ capabilities and shortfalls and 
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utilizing the concept of interdependence to optimize the overall capability of the team. The 
additional requirements for interdependence are derived from “the need to understand and 
influence those engaged in the joint activity” (Johnson 2014, 67), and the requirements 
revolve around the notions of observability, predictability and directability (OPD), which 
the model represents as an interface for interaction between the robot and human, as shown 
in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Coactive System Model Based on OPD. Source: Johnson (2014). 
3. Observability, Predictability, and Directability 
The Observability, Predictability, and Directability (OPD) requirements serve as 
the three levels of interaction between a robot and human during task performance that 
enables interdependence in the coactive systems model, and are defined by Johnson (2014) 
as follows: 
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Observability means making pertinent aspects of one’s status, as well as 
one’s knowledge of the team, task, and environment observable to others. 
Since interdependence is about complementary relations, observability also 
involves the ability to observe and interpret pertinent signals and plays a 
role in many teamwork patterns e.g., monitoring progress and providing 
backup behavior. 
 
Predictability means one’s actions should be predictable enough that others 
can reasonably rely on them when considering their own actions. The 
complementary relationship is considering others’ actions when developing 
one’s own. Predictability is also essential to many teamwork patterns such 
as synchronizing actions and achieving efficiency in team performance. 
 
Directability means one’s ability to direct the behavior of others and 
complementarily by directed by others. It includes explicit commands such 
as task allocation and role assignment as well as subtler influences, such as 
providing guidance or suggestions or even providing salient information 
that is anticipated to alter behavior, such as a warning. Teamwork patterns 
that involve directability include such things as requesting assistance and 
querying for input during decision making. (68–69) 
With these definitions in place, a designer would be aware of the requirements for 
collaboration depending on which interdependence relationship the human is required to 
support. There is no need for all three relationships of OPD to be supported for each task 
as the framework would only be applied where necessary based upon the operating 
requirements for each task. Therefore, “the goal of a designer is not to maximize or 
minimize OPD. It is to attain sufficient OPD to support the necessary interdependent 
relationships” (Johnson 2014, 69) 
4. Coactive Design Method 
With the Coactive System Model and understanding of the concept of 
interdependence, the Coactive Design Method was introduced which consists of three main 
processes, namely Identification, Selection and Implementation, and Evaluation of Change 
(Johnson 2014). An overview of the method is shown in Figure 5.  
Wilcox and Chenoweth (2017) classified the Coactive Design Method as “a typical 
cascading design process” (15) with added feedback loops to represent its iterative nature 
which makes it more responsive and relevant to real-world design challenges. 
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Figure 5. Coactive Design Method. Source: Johnson (2014). 
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a. The Identification Process 
An analysis tool, called the Interdependence Analysis (IA) table, as shown in 
Figure 6, was proposed to aid designers in the application of the Identification Process.  
 
Figure 6. Interdependence Analysis Table. Source: Johnson (2014). 
With application starting from the left, the first step is to input a traditional task 
analysis process which decomposes the required tasks to sufficient hierarchical levels of 
tasks and sub-tasks for clear distinction during task execution. The capacities required to 
execute the identified sub-tasks or functions are then listed. These should not be limited to 
informational needs, but also include knowledge, skills, and abilities from the performers. 
Next the various configurations of team role alternatives should be considered. The team 
elements are divided into the Performer and Supporting Team Member roles, and the 
number of configurations would depend on the size of the team and the number of potential 
main task performing elements. The assessment of the ability of each element in their role 
to perform or support the task is next evaluated and categorized according to the color 
scheme depicted in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. IA Color Scheme. Source: Johnson (2014). 
The definition of each color differs between Performers and Supporting Team 
Members. The colors in the Performer column are focused on assessing that element’s 
ability to carry out the task, with green signifying that the element can conduct the task 
independently without any assistance, while yellow signifies some margin of error during 
execution. Orange indicates that the element cannot perform the task completely on its 
own, and red indicates that the element cannot conduct the task at all. The categories for 
Supporting Team Members focus on their ability to support the Performer in their 
accomplishment of a particular task in a certain capacity. Green indicates an improvement 
in efficiency, perhaps in speed of calculation, while yellow indicates an improvement in 
reliability in the area of object identification as an example. These are soft constraints and 
could improve the outcome of the task execution but are not critical to task completion. 
Orange represents a situation in which assistance is required for the task to be completed 
and is therefore a hard constraint. Red indicates that the particular element is unable to 
render any form of support to the Performer (Johnson 2014). 
 With evaluation of the ability of the various elements in different roles completed, 
the resultant color pattern would be analyzed to identify interdependence requirements to 
enable task completion. A summary of the interpretation of different color combinations 




Figure 8. Interdependence Interpretation based on IA Color Scheme. Source: 
Johnson (2014). 
The color allocated to the Performer indicates the level of reliability or ability to 
perform the task independently, with green indicating it can be relied upon to complete the 
task, yellow indicating some brittleness in terms of level of reliability, orange indicating a 
hard interdependency requirement due to the deficit of a certain capacity, and red showing 
a complete lack of that capacity. The interdependency requirements from the supporting 
team members are straightforward to identify and can be interpreted in any of the following 
three ways. Must be independent indicates that the Supporting Team Member cannot offer 
any support to the Performer. Hard interdependency is a type of hard constraint and would 
therefore be essential for task completion, while soft interdependency is a type of soft 
constraint, and the provision of support could offer “valuable opportunities for teamwork 
and alternative pathways to a solution” (Johnson 2014, 77). 
The final step in the Identification Process is the determination of OPD 
requirements. These requirements can be derived from the IA table based on the type of 
interdependency required between the Performers and Supporting Team Members. 
Johnson (2014) used an example of obstacle avoidance analysis through an IA table, as 




Figure 9. Example of OPD Requirement Analysis. Source: Johnson (2014). 
Johnson (2014) continued that it could be interpreted from the table that the robot, 
or Performer, is able to sense obstacles independently, but is not able to reliably determine 
if it can be avoided. In this aspect the human, or Supporting Team Member, as able to 
render assistance to improve the reliability of the interpretation. This gives rise to an 
observability requirement by the robot to the human, which in this case is the robot’s 
knowledge of the environment which could be image from a camera or sonar image 
mapping. With the information of the obstacle, the human and assist to interpret if the 
obstacle can be passed which in turn leads to the directability requirement from the human 
to the robot, which in this example is the requirement whereby the human tells the robot to 
proceed or not.  
b. The Selection and Implementation Process 
The OPD requirements generated in the Identification Process are used as the 
initiator for the Selection and Implementation Process, in which the mechanisms, or 
solutions, needed to meet the requirements are established. The variability and quantity of 
possible solutions point towards a creative process with several design outcomes, in which 
the generated OPD requirements would be able to provide a succinct set of evaluation 
criteria to assist in determining the sufficiency of the proposed solution (Johnson 2014). 
That is, as the designers envision solutions, as part of the left side of the Vee model, they 
are also imagining the evaluation criteria needed as part of the Verification and Validation 
phases on the right side of the Vee model.  
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c. The Evaluation of Change Process 
Johnson (2014) explains the necessity of the final process in the Coactive Design 
Method as it evaluates the applied mechanism “in the context of the entire system which 
can lead to iterating through both the identification process and/or the selection and 
implementation process” (80) to ultimately reach a solution which balances the effort 
entailed in supporting interdependence against the achieved outcomes. Other traditional 
evaluation methods can subsequently be conducted to assess the other facets of the system. 
In all, the Coactive Design Method serves as a launch point for designers to build 
interdependent human-machine systems and provides a relatively easy to use framework 
to guide the discovery of interdependencies between the different elements in a human-
machine team. Because it is well structured, integration of the Coactive Design process 
into the standard Systems Engineering Vee model process should not face undue 
challenges. 
D. SEARCH AND RESCUE  
1. Inland SAR in the United States 
The United States Department of Homeland Security (2008) defines SAR as “the 
performance of distress monitoring, communications, location of distressed personnel, 
coordination, and execution of rescue operations including extrication or evacuation along 
with the provisioning of medical assistance and civilian services through the use of public 
and private resources to assist persons and property in potential or actual distress” (9-1), 
with inland/wilderness SAR being further defined as “SAR operations conducted in 
backcountry, remote, or undeveloped or rural or roadless areas that primarily require 
operations necessitating the use of specialized equipment to access these areas and may 
require responders traveling over land by alternate methods or by aircraft” (9-2). 
In 2017, 3,453 incidents that required SAR took place in national parks within the 
United States at an expense of approximately 84,000 manhours and over $3 million 
(Vollman 2019). 2003 to 2006 saw 12,337 SAR operations at a cost of over $16 million, 
of which day-hiking accounted for 3912 cases, or 31.7% (Heggie and Heggie 2009). A 
study to identify SAR trends within national parks between 1992 to 2007 found that out of 
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2,430 SAR incidents in 2005, hiking was the most common activity to require SAR, 
accounting for 48% of all SAR operations and 22.8% of all fatalities in national parks 
(Heggie and Amundson 2009). The financial impact of SAR operations from 1992 to 2007 
came up to $58.5 million (Heggie and Amundson 2009). With approximately 193 million 
acres of public land to cover (Warren 2020), these figures emphasize the significant impact 
that hiking incidents have on human lives and the increasing manpower and financial strain 
it adds to the responding agencies that need to execute these SAR operations with limited 
and sometimes labor-intensive methods (Peruzzi 2020). 
2. Improving Efficiency of Inland SAR through Unmanned Platforms 
The potential benefits of incorporating a UAS into inland SAR was first 
demonstrated in 2011, in which a United States Air Force unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 
was provided to aid SAR operations at the White Sands National Monument. The inclusion 
of the UAV allowed the park rangers to reduce the search area to within a quarter of a mile 
from where the casualties were eventually found (National Park Service 2016), without the 
need for expansive search operations on foot.  
In 2016, the U.S. National Parks Service took its first steps to modernize its SAR 
capabilities by introducing an unmanned aircraft system (UAS), which is seen as “a 
valuable tool in many situations to increase situational awareness and decrease risk on 
search and rescue events” (National Park Service 2017, para. 2) with the main aim of 
assisting the agency to “reduce risks to personnel, resources and visitors, and shrink costs 
to the agency for missions normally accomplished with manned aircraft while 
accomplishing the mandates of the National Park Service” (para. 3). This shows a 
willingness to introduce unmanned systems into inland SAR operations in the near future 
as a means to aid ground teams and reduce the workload and response times. 
3. Flash Floods in National Parks  
Flash floods are characterized by “a sudden increase in the depth and speed of water 
in rivers, streams, or washes due to heavy rain from thunderstorm” (National Park Service 
2021, para. 2) which is unpredictable and can even happen with clear weather. Flash floods 
cannot be outrun, and the best chance of survival for someone who is trapped in a flash 
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flood is to head for higher ground and wait it out as it can take “hours for flood waters to 
recede” (para. 6).  
Flash floods are especially deadly inside deep and narrow slot canyons, such as the 
example shown in Figure 10, in which a sudden downpour of rain cannot be absorbed by 
the dry and hard-packed soil and instead runs off through the slot canyons where “water 
flow can increase by more than 100 times in a matter of minutes” (Pierce 2021, para. 4), 
which is significant as fast flowing water just six inches deep is enough to pull a person off 
their feet (National Park Service 2021).  
 
Figure 10. Example of a Slot Canyon. Source: Dixon (2018). 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed existing literature for key aspects that would be further 
developed in this thesis. Starting with the traditional Systems Engineering Process and Vee 
model, we saw its evolution into an effective modern tool that utilizes MBSE and SysML 
for complex systems development. Next, the obstacles to establishing effective human-
machine automation were explored, and Johnson’s (2014) Coactive Design Model was 
introduced as an approach to guide designers towards more interdependent human-machine 
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systems to overcome those challenges. Finally, the field of inland SAR and its challenges 




III. RESEARCH METHOD 
A. OVERVIEW 
The research conducted in the previous chapter created an awareness of coactive 
design and its potential application as part of a larger design and development process. In 
this chapter, an approach for the infusion of the coactive design method into systems 
engineering will be presented with an introduction of an accompanying high-level 
development exercise for SAR operations to demonstrate the potential gains of the 
proposed approach. 
B. SCOPE, DEFINITIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
A condensed SAR system development exercise to demonstrate the integration of 
coactive design with systems engineering into a Coactive Systems Engineering Design 
(COSEED) process will focus on the requirements and interdependencies of a SAR HMT 
system. This would include an unmanned solution that can respond to emergency situations 
and provide a range of capabilities to extend the reach of a conventional SAR team which 
typically consists of manned aircraft, off-road vehicles, park rangers and volunteers.  
The Systems Engineering Vee model would be utilized to guide the development 
and assessment of the solution. The design reference mission (DRM) framework will also 
be employed to aid in the understanding of the environment surrounding the mission 
analysis. This would include the establishment of a capability need, an operational context 
within which the solution would operate, the physical environment in which the system 
would operate and parameters for measuring mission success (Giammarco, Hunt, and 
Whitcomb 2015). The needs of the key stakeholders and the obstacles to the successful 
operation of the SAR system would also be analyzed. 
The operational situation (OPSIT) to guide this COSEED demonstration is a flash 
flood which can leave multiple groups of hikers and campers who were attempting to 
escape the rapidly rising water levels trapped on high ground in an area up to 8 miles away. 
Access routes for SAR teams would be cut off by the flood waters and would remain 
impassable for a few hours, and a solution is required to locate and communicate with any 
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casualties and provide them with supplies to meet their basic survival needs until they can 
be safely extricated. 
Some conceptual solutions will next be developed and analyzed for potential 
effectiveness and one concept would be selected for further development. Next a concept 
of operations (CONOPS) would be established to clearly express what the user intends to 
accomplish through the system’s major capabilities (Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011). 
This is the first stage in the DoDAF operational view model branch, the OV-1. The System 
Requirements phase would continue from here and be represented through an IA Table, 
operational activity model (OV-5), systems functionality description (SV-4), and an 
operational activity-systems function traceability matrix (SV-5). These graphical 
representations make use of internal block, block definition, and activity diagrams 
established in the SysML framework for MBSE.  
The High-Level Design stage would be demonstrated through a generation of 
alternative architectures followed by a decision analysis using Morphological Analysis to 
select the optimum solution and the process would move to the next stage of system 
development. From here, a reduced scope would be adopted to provide a more elaborate 
and in-depth perspective of the Subsystem Requirements phase through a similar lens as 
the System Requirements phase, and Unit Testing and Subsystem Integration and Testing 
phases would be elaborated through the derived Measures of Performance. This would be 
accomplished by zooming into one aspect of the SAR operation for development analysis.  
The scope of analysis for the development exercise will expand again to cover the 
whole SAR system as the process moves to the System Integration and Verification phase 
and continues up the right side of the Vee model, in which the development exercise will 
conclude at the Operations phase. These phases will be evaluated using derived Measures 
of Performance (MOPs) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) of the SAR system. 
Table 3 represents a summary of the stages and demonstration methods that will be 
presented for the COSEED development exercise. The Project Planning, Systems 
Engineering Management Plan (SEMP), Detailed Design and Software Coding and 
Hardware Fabrication phases will be omitted from this exercise as this thesis offers a 
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conceptual demonstration of a development process and deliberately disregards certain 
project specific parameters such as review milestones, schedule, and budget.  
Table 3. Systems Engineering Process Demonstration Scope. 
Vee Model Stage Demonstration Method 
Needs Assessment 
Capability Need Statement 





Obstacles To Successful Operation 
Concept Selection Pugh Matrix 
Project Planning Excluded From Demonstration 
SEMP Excluded From Demonstration 
Concept of Operations CONOPS (OV-1) 
System Requirements 
IA Table 
Operational Activity Model (OV-5) 
Systems Functionality Description (SV-4) 
Operational Activity – Systems Function Traceability Matrix (SV-5) 
High Level Design Alternative Architectures Morphological Box 
Subsystem Requirements 
Operational Activity Model (OV-5) 
Logical and Physical Data Model (DIV-2 and DIV-3) 
Technical Specifications 
Detailed Design Excluded From Demonstration 
Software Coding and 
Hardware Fabrication Excluded From Demonstration 
Unit Testing Measures of Performance 
Subsystem Integration and 
Verification Measures of Performance 
System Integration and 
Verification 
Measures of Performance 
Measures of Effectiveness 
Initial Deployment and 
System Validation 
Measures of Performance 
Measures of Effectiveness 
Operations Measures of Effectiveness 
 
With a systems engineering demonstration process established, areas in which 
coactive design can be integrated to support the described systems engineering processes 
will be elaborated in the next section. 
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C. SYNTHESIS OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND COACTIVE DESIGN  
The combination of two different entities, even if they are from the same field, is 
not a straightforward task to be underestimated. A forced mating would have disastrous 
consequences, but a smooth joint could reap benefits even greater than the individual’s 
potential. The coming sections describe how coactive design can be smoothly integrated 
into the multi-phase systems engineering approach and how it will be demonstrated. 
1. Overview of Coactive Design within the Systems Engineering Model 
The conventional Systems Engineering Vee model and other available models only 
explicitly considers the system, which traditionally refers to the machine aspect of a 
system. This was relevant in the past, in a time when computerized systems were not as 
advanced or intelligent, and the complexity of operation was still relatively low. Over time 
as humans became more involved in the operation of machines and machines became more 
capable in performing intricate and complex tasks, the systems engineering models were 
not updated to reflect the importance of the human operator in the system development. 
Interweaving coactive design into the process forces designers to consider the existence of 
a human interaction aspect within the HMT system through its interdependence 
relationship with the machine. 
The findings from research conducted on the coactive design method shows that it 
guides designers to generate interdependence requirements in the human-machine team. 
These requirements help designers better understand the internal support structure that the 
agents require when they interact within the system, as they dictate what the system and 
sub-systems would need to provide the human operator and what assistance the human 
operator can offer to the system to accomplish its assigned tasks. This notion corresponds 
with the left side of the Vee model, starting from System Requirements and continuing 
down to the Detailed Design as highlighted in the green dotted box in Figure 11. 
Subsequently, the Unit Testing and Verification phases on the lower right side of 
the Vee model highlighted in the purple solid box can make use of the interdependence 
requirements derived from the IA table to verify that the developed solution is able to meet 
the pre-determined system specifications. 
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Correspondingly, the Validation and Operations phases on the upper right side of 
the Vee model highlighted in the orange dashed box would make use of the established 
workflows to validate the solution against the needs of the various stakeholders.  
 
Figure 11. Areas of Coactive Design Integration in Systems Engineering Vee 
Model. Adapted from Langford (2009). 
2. Implementing Coactive Design in the Systems Engineering Vee 
An Interdependence Analysis table, as introduced in Figure 6, will be prepared as 
part of the development exercise within the System Requirements phase to study the 
potential interdependencies within the HMT as prescribed in the coactive design method 
in Figure 5. For the purposes of this exercise, a simple team of agents comprising a single 
human operator and one unmanned platform will be examined to gauge their ability to 
carry out the required capacities to support the mission. 
First, the relevant tasks and hierarchical sub-tasks to support the prescribed mission 
would be organized in chronological order so that the activities would flow in a sequential 
and logical manner for the purpose of consistency and ease of reviews. Next, the required 
capacities from the agents to execute the sub-tasks will be established, thus providing an 
initial indication on the scope of specifications that the HMT system would require to 
perform the mission. 
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Following that, their ability to perform or support the stated capacities depending 
on their role as a performer or supporting team member, respectively, will be derived and 
classified, as dictated in Figure 7. Next, the potential interdependencies based on the 
agents’ abilities to perform and support the tasks will be identified, which will in turn allow 
the development of the OPD requirements for the relationships between the human 
operator and unmanned system.  
With the OPD and required capacities in place, they form a part of the System 
Requirements since the operator is also a stakeholder in the overall HMT system and will 
also form part of the baseline for the High-Level Design, Subsystem Requirements and 
Detailed Design phases. 
Next, a process workflow will be drawn up as a visual representation of the 
sequential execution of a component of the overall mission for the SAR HMT system. This 
workflow can be utilized in design reviews, verification, and validation stages. 
D. ASSUMPTIONS 
With the development exercise in place, a list of assumptions was established to 
apply some limit to the amount of variability. This list is non-exhaustive and may be 
expanded upon during the course of the exercise. 
1. Only one team comprising of one human operator and one unmanned 
system would be developed for analysis. 
2. The unmanned system would operate in areas with clearly defined hiking 
trails and camping areas. 
3. The unmanned system consists of the unmanned platform and its 
associated computerized control systems based in the operating center. 
4. The human operator would be based in the operating center. 
5. Route planning and drone deployment would be executed by a human 
operator. 
33 
6. Commercial off-the-shelf unmanned systems would be used for the 
assessment of current technological readiness levels and capabilities.  
7. There are an unknown number of casualties in the search area. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the approach that will be implemented to demonstrate the 
COSEED process with an inland SAR scenario serving as the backdrop for the analysis. 
The constraints and assumptions of this development exercise were also explained and the 
results from the execution of the COSEED process will be detailed in the next chapter. 
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IV. COSEED SAR RESULTS  
This chapter presents and discusses the results from each step of the COSEED 
development process that aims to develop a solution through the workflow presented in the 
previous chapter. The results will illustrate how Coactive Design can contribute to the 
Systems Engineering Process and address the challenges put forth in the operational 
scenario. 
The demonstration focuses on the enactment of the COSEED process and therefore 
does not attempt to derive detailed and implementable models and specifications within 
the solution space. Sufficient information will be presented to support the development of 
subsequent phases in the process. 
A. NEEDS ASSESSMENT PHASE 
The motivation to start a lengthy new system development cycle stems from an 
operational deficiency (Kossiakoff et al. 2011) and the first stage in a system development 
cycle, the Needs Assessment, is critical to establishing a thorough understanding of the 
deficiency so that a solution can be adequately designed to address it. This phase in the 
Systems Engineering Process provides a guide to understanding the fundamental needs 
from the solution and is an essential initiator for the development process of any system, 
allowing designers to dissect the operational and technical needs of the system to better 
understand what needs to be developed. The steps taken to examine the demands from the 
solution will be elaborated in the coming sections. 
1. Capability Need Statement and Projected Operational Environment 
The identified capability need is for a SAR HMT system that can project search, 
identification, and resupply activities when vehicle and foot access is hampered. The 
system is projected to operate in day and night outdoor conditions, with temperatures 
ranging between 14 to 104oF (-10 to 40oC), wind speeds of up to 20mph (32kph), light rain 
defined with “rate of fall varying between a trace and 0.25 cm (0.10 in.) per hour, the 
maximum rate of fall being no more than 0.025 cm (0.01 in.) in six minutes” (American 
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Meteorological Society 2012) or drifting snow conditions defined as “snow on the ground 
that is blown by the wind to a height of less than 1.5 to 2 meters (5 to 6.5 feet) above the 
surface” (National Snow & Ice Data Center 2020), and entail communications and data 
links with the operating center located up to 8 miles away. 
2. Operational Objectives 
As a pre-requisite to the formation of requirements, the objectives of the solution 
must be first established. The operational objectives of the SAR system studied in this 
design exercise are shown in Figure 12 in the form of an Objectives Tree which 
decomposes the mission’s objectives. 
 
Figure 12. SAR System Objectives Tree. 
3. Functional Analysis 
A functional analysis was next conducted to translate the operational objectives into 
a list of required system functions. Here the Tasks and Hierarchical Sub-tasks in the IA 
table were generated to directly address the secondary objectives and forms the starting 
point for the Coactive Design Interdependence Analysis and is the first point in the Systems 
Engineering Process in which the coactive design method is introduced. The results are 
shown in Table 4. There are instances in which a Task can be decomposed into more than 
one Sub-task as illustrated in the green cells, and the possibility that more than one 
Operational Objective can be addressed with the same Task, highlighted in the orange cells. 
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These activities can be expanded to cover more detail as the requirements and scope of the 
solution becomes clearer. 
Table 4. Tasks and Sub-tasks to Address Objectives. 
Operational Objective  Task Hierarchical Sub-tasks 
Find Casualties Search For Casualties  Scan Area of Interest Detect Casualty 
Track Casualties Determine Location of Casualties Capture Location 
Assess Injuries Communicate With Casualties Broadcast and Relay Messages Inform Rescue Status 
Deliver Essential and 
Comfort Supplies Deliver Supplies Transfer Supplies to Casualty 
 
4. Stakeholder Needs 
Stakeholders, defined as any individual or groups of individuals that have vested 
interest in, a level of influence over, or who will be affected by the decisions made in a 
project (Kossiakoff et al. 2011; Hahn 2010), can be any member of society from the 
environment in which the system operates. They have varying levels of interest and 
influence in the project and can be the solution manufacturer, system user, program 
sponsor, beneficiary, or casual observers. 
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Figure 13. Stakeholder Analysis Matrix. Adapted from Mendelow (1981). 
The envisioned stakeholders for this HMT system and their corresponding levels 
of influence and interest in the system are summarized in Figure 13, which was developed 
based on the Mendelow (1981) Matrix for Stakeholder Analysis, in which the Influence of 
the stakeholder is illustrated in a chart against their perceived level of Interest, with a 
position on the bottom left corner of the chart indicating zero influence and interest and a 
position on the top right corner of the chart indicating maximum influence and interest. 
It could be deduced from the matrix that other than the manufacturers, SAR 
community, and National Parks Service as the more obvious entities with a vested interest 
in the system, the inputs from park users, who are potential casualties, should also be taken 
into consideration for their needs and preferences. The key concerns of these groups of 
persons have been summarized in Table 5 and should be carefully considered during the 
system design and development process. 
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Table 5. Stakeholders and Key Concerns. 
Stakeholder Key Concerns 
System Manufacturers • Maximizing ROI 
• Reliable system 
• Low manufacturing cost 
• Reputation 
SAR Community • New technology to improve capabilities 
• Cost-effective 
National Parks Service • Cost-effective and reliable SAR system 
• Minimizing manpower resources for SAR 
• Swift identification of casualties 
• Swift extrication of casualties 
Park Users/Casualties • Speed of assistance 
• Speed of extrication 
• Availability of survival supplies 
Hobbyists • Advances in technology and capabilities 
• New functions and open-source codes 
 
5. Success Requirements 
Benchmarks for success are a key driving factor in the development of new 
systems. INCOSE (2006) refers to these as measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and 
measures of performance (MOPs) which are succinctly defined as the operational measures 
and physical or functional attributes required respectively for mission success. Kossiakoff 
et al. (2011) added the MOEs can be either qualitative or quantitative measures at the 
system level, whereas MOPs should be quantitative measures at a sub-system level. 
Together the MOEs and MOPs serve as a lighthouse for designers to work towards 
when considering the different elements of the system. The key MOEs and MOPs 
determined for the COSEED design exercise are summarized in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Unmanned SAR System MOEs and MOPs. 
Category Standard 
MOEs • Detect and assist casualties at least 8 miles away 
• Detect casualty in search area within 30 minutes of scan commencement 
• Determine casualty location within 1 minute of detection 
• Establish communications link with casualty within 10 minutes of location 
confirmation 
• Deliver supplies to casualty within 15 minutes of location confirmation 
• No more than 10% of collisions/crashes due to detectable system errors 
MOPs • Detect at least 95% of casualties correctly on clear day with good visibility 
• Locate at least 99% of casualties accurately on clear day with good visibility 
• Follow required route with at least 95% accuracy on clear day with good visibility 
• Deliver messages with 95% reliability on clear day with no wind 
• Transmit messages with 95% clarity on clear day with no wind 
• Deliver supplies with 99% reliability on clear day with good visibility and no wind 
• Flight time of at least 45 minutes on clear day with no wind 
• Maximum flight speed of at least 30 mph on clear day with no wind 
• Payload capacity of at least 10lbs 
 
6. Obstacles to Successful Operation 
Understanding the obstacles that would inhibit the successful achievement of the 
measures laid out in the previous section demonstrates a segment of risk management. A 
conscious awareness of these barriers would channel designers’ efforts towards designs 
that pre-emptively mitigate the impact of these risks. Some of the identified obstacles are 
listed in Table 7 and have been separated into external and internal elements, which refer 
to features that are outside and within the boundaries of the system respectively. 
The Needs Assessment phase would culminate in a Stakeholder Needs Review 
(SNR) to holistically capture and align the relevant needs of all the stakeholders for the 
SAR HMT system. 
Table 7. Obstacles for SAR HMT System Success. 
Category Obstacle 
External Factors 
Inclement weather that hampers visibility and control mechanisms 
Tight terrain which limits visibility and maneuverability, and increases 
probability of collision  
Casualties that change location without informing SAR team 
Internal Factors 
Lower than anticipated battery life 
Lower than anticipated operating range 
Lower than anticipated system reliability 
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B. CONCEPT SELECTION PHASE 
With the various needs from different perspectives for the system established, the 
next phase in the Systems Engineering Process is to list the possible solutions and select 
the eventual form the solution would take. This began with a brainstorming exercise which 
focused on airborne-based solutions due to their higher rate of ground coverage and 
increased ease of covering the difficult terrain that the system would encounter during its 
support of SAR missions. 










































































Speed S - + + S 
Mission Durability S + - - S 
Mission Flexibility S - + - S 
Susceptibility to Weather S - - - S 
Training Effort S S + + + 
Initial Investment S S + + - 
Operating Cost S S + + S 
Ground Infrastructure S - + S S 
Total + 0 1 6 4 1 
Total - 0 4 2 3 1 
Total Score 0 -4 4 1 0 
 
Table 8 illustrates the analysis of options through the use of the Pugh Matrix, which 
is an easy-to-use technique that relies on pairwise comparisons between different design 
candidates against a baseline (Pugh 1991). The baseline for comparison is a manned 
helicopter and the criteria used to conduct the comparison is extracted from the Functional 
and Stakeholder Needs Analyses results. The assessment outcomes ‘S’, ‘+’ and ‘-’ indicate 
neutral, positive, and negative fulfillment of the assessment criteria respectively.  
The final score from the Pugh Matrix analysis shows that a multi-rotor type drone 
has the highest total score and is therefore the selected concept for the unmanned SAR 
HMT system solution in this development exercise, which henceforth would be referred to 
as the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).  
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C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
The concept of operations (CONOPS) is the first stage in the DoDAF Operational 
Viewpoint model, the OV-1. The OV-1 is offered in Figure 14, and depicts a visual 
representation of the operational concept of the SAR HMT system which includes a human 
operator stationed at an operating center with an unmanned aerial system (UAS) 
comprising of a command and control system and a number of UAVs that can 
independently scan for human casualties along a pre-defined route, tag their location via 
GPS, enable audio communications with the human operator to deliver messages and 
receive feedback, and to deliver essential supplies for survival based on the determined 
GPS coordinates.  
 
Figure 14. CONOPS for SAR HMT System. 
A System Concept Review (SCR) may be conducted at this stage to seek 
endorsement of the concept of the solution and how it would be utilized to address the 
stakeholders’ needs established in the SRR. 
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D. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS PHASE 
1. Interdependence Analysis Table 
With a multi-rotor drone selected as the solution concept and the CONOPS 
established, a follow-up round of Functional Analysis was conducted and the Tasks and 
Sub-task columns in the IA table were expanded to include pre- and post- mission 
activities, according to Operational Objectives, as shown in Table 9. This step is necessary 
to conclude that all operational objectives are captured before proceeding to the next phase. 
Table 9. Initial IA Table Reflecting Pre- and Post- Mission Tasks. 
Operational Objective Task Hierarchical Sub-tasks 
Prepare for Mission Deploy for Mission System Functional Check Move to Mission Area 
Find Casualties Search For Casualties  
Share Media with Operating Base 
Scan Area of Interest 
Detect Casualties 
Identify Casualties 
Track Casualties Determine Location of Casualties Move to Appropriate Location Capture Location 
Assess Injuries Communicate With Casualties Move to Appropriate Location Inform Rescue Status Broadcast And Relay Messages 
Deliver Essential and 
Comfort Supplies Deliver Supplies 
Move to Appropriate Location 
Transfer Supplies to Casualty 
System Preservation Return to Base Determine Mission-Abort/Completion Move to Operating Base 
 
The IA table was then further expanded to include the corresponding capacities 
required to perform the derived tasks to fully capture the functions that the UAS would 
need to perform throughout the mission. The resultant table has a total of 47 capacities, 
which are depicted in Table 15 in Appendix A.  
The following sections illustrate operational and system DoDAF model viewpoints 
that differentiated the system into the peopleware, and hardware and software aspects 
respectively. The diagrams were generated utilizing the information garnered from the IA 
table to illustrate the workflows and system functionality and ensure congruency between 
the two aspects.  
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The list of models that can be generated at this and subsequent stages are non-
exhaustive and those presented in this thesis are merely intended to illustrate the potential 
interlink between the IA table and MBSE and how they can be applied to support the 
development of each other. 
2. Operational Activity Model (OV-5) 
An OV-5 model that illustrates the response of the proposed SAR HMT UAS 
system to address the original operation scenario is shown in Figure 16 in Appendix B. The 
three human elements in the system are the SAR coordinator, UAS Operator and the 
Casualty. 
The SAR coordinator is responsible for activating the HMT UAS system to assist 
with the SAR operation. The UAS Operator will support the UAS functional check before 
plotting the route the UAV would take to the area of operations and triggering the UAV 
for deployment. The Operator would then await feedback from the UAS for any potential 
casualties found and classify them as required. They would next record the GPS location 
of a confirmed casualty before commencing audio communications with the casualty and 
initiating the delivery of essential supplies. Upon completion of the necessary tasks, the 
Operator would prompt the UAV to return to base. 
3. Systems Functionality Description (SV-4) 
An SV-4 model was produced to summarize the functions that the UAS would 
require to support the required inland SAR operations. The model is shown in Figure 17 in 
Appendix B. The UAS performs command and control (C2) functions over the UAV and 
fulfills all forms of media and location recording requirements in its database. The UAV is 
part of the UAS and is therefore one of the listed sub-functions. 
The functions in the UAV are further decomposed in Figure 18 in Appendix B and 
are closely related to and shaped by the Required Capacities listed in the IA table.  
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4. Operational Activity – Systems Function Traceability Matrix (SV-5) 
The SV-5 model in Figure 19 in Appendix B consolidates all identified OAs and 
functions from the previous two models and provides an overview of the interface between 
the two facets to ensure that all OAs are addressed by a particular system function. This 
step assists the designer in ensuring that all Tasks and Sub-tasks in the IA table are 
addressed by a particular capacity or function in the system. 
By the end of the Systems Requirement phase, it can be observed that the IA table 
heavily influenced the derivation of the OV-5 and SV-4 models through the derived tasks 
and sub-tasks, and required capacities, demonstrating the close relationship between the 
two processes. The SV-5 model validated the congruency between the OV-5 and SV-4 
models thereby verifying the consistency in the IA table.  
A System Requirements Review (SRR) should be conducted at this stage to assess 
the derived requirements for consistency and align the stakeholders in all aspects of the 
development cycle up to this point. Here the models generated under the MBSE framework 
would aid in the dissemination of information and improve the levels of understanding of 
the stakeholders from various backgrounds. 
E. HIGH-LEVEL DESIGN PHASE 
The next phase in the demonstrative COSEED process is a study of alternative 
architectures focusing on the UAV system within the larger context of the UAS system, to 
enable completion of the required mission within a realistic and achievable physical model. 
The following sections elaborate on this evaluation process. 
1. Alternative Architectures 
The system analysis has thus far focused on the functions that the UAV would need 
to execute, without considering how the functions would be distributed within the UAV 
team and in what groups the teams would operate in.  
Beginning with the distribution of functions within the UAV team, research 
conducted on current technology readiness levels and commercial developments found that 
there are commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) UAVs that can perform surveillance, 
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communication, and package delivery in three independent, standalone packages (Ascent 
Aerosystems n.d.; UAV Systems International n.d.; McNabb 2021). Advances in design 
and battery technology also allow longer flight times through in-flight hot swapping 
(Atwell 2019). Exploiting ready commercial solutions could reduce development timelines 
and costs and allow designers to focus on other areas of development such as integration 
with the C2 system and IA between the UAS and operator. The assumption moving forward 
for the remainder of this COSEED development process is therefore three separate UAV 
systems performing the search, communication, and supply functions. 
The next architecture that would need to be considered is from the perspective of 
functional teaming, or in this case UAV capability teaming. Would the search and 
communication functions need to operate in tandem to meet the requirements for time on-
station? Can the supply UAV make it out to the casualty in time and have sufficient battery 
power to return to base? These questions are non-exhaustive and require several rounds of 
detailed analysis between the stakeholders to identify the optimum operating architecture. 
For the purposes of this demonstration, it would be assumed that all three functions 
would operate independently, and their corresponding UAVs would be deployed 
sequentially as required; the communications UAV would only be launched after the search 
UAV has successfully located a casualty and determined its GPS position, and the supply 
UAV would only be deployed after communication between the operator and casualty has 
been established and the operator has determined that the casualty will be able to receive 
and utilize the supply kit. 
2. Solutions to Deliver Capabilities 
At this stage the exact nature of the types of solutions for the required UAV’s 
capacities, such as methods of determining UAV location or communicating with 
casualties, should be evaluated. A morphological box exercise was conducted as an 
example of an approach to generate solution configurations for the analysis of the supply 
pack delivery system that would be mounted on the UAV, with the outcome shown in Table 
10 in which the selected configuration is survival packs delivered in boxes that are layered 
horizontally underneath the UAV that will be dropped near the casualty.  
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Table 10. Morphological Box Example for Pack Delivery System. 


















Dropped from height. 
Pack is dropped from height 
so that UAV does not need 
to land. 
Land and release. 
UAV lands, releases pack, 
and automatically flies 
away. 
Land and collect. 
UAV lands, pack is collected, 
and client acknowledges 
before UAV flies away. 
 
For the purposes of this development exercise, it is assumed that the following 
solution types shown in Table 11 were selected through a round of analysis and discussion 
between stakeholders. This configuration of solutions would guide the development of 
system requirements, the IA table, and subsequent phases of the UAS development. 
Table 11. Assumed Sub-System Solution Types. 
Hierarchical Sub-task Solution Type 
Detect Casualties Thermal Imaging Technology 
Identify Casualties Electro-Optical Technology 
Capture Location Global Positioning System (GPS) Technology 
Share Media with Operating Base Wireless Data Transfer Technology 
Broadcast And Relay Messages Speaker and Microphone 
  
 
F. SUBSYSTEM REQUIREMENTS PHASE 
With the system architecture established, a more in-depth study into the sub-
systems can be performed. For illustrative purposes, this development exercise will focus 
on one out of the three functional UAVs, the Supply UAV which serves to deliver supply 
kits to casualties.  
Separate IA tables for each type of UAV were then generated to better analyze the 
unique interdependencies required for the functions that UAV type would need to execute. 
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The IA table for the Supply UAV is shown in Table 16 in Appendix A. At this phase of 
system development, the OPD requirements should be developed to gain a clearer sense of 
the necessary interdependencies for the Supply UAV in the SAR HMT as these 
relationships would have a direct impact on the design of subsystem requirements. 
1. Operational Activity Model (OV-5) 
The Operational Viewpoint in the DoDAF model is “traditionally materiel 
independent” (Office of the Chief Information Officer 2010a) implying an inclusion of only 
human agents that influence the operation of the system. To better cater for the introduction 
of the UAV as a team-mate in a HMT system and enable the appropriate analysis of the role 
it plays as an intelligent system that can contribute in both a performing and supporting role, 
the COSEED process proposes that the UAV be included as the fourth agent in the OV 
models. To demonstrate this application, the Deliver Supplies sub-task from the Supply UAV 
IA table was generated and is shown in the OV-5 model in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15. OV-5 Model for Deliver Supplies Sub-Task. 
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The sequence of events shown follows the scenario in which the UAV is the main 
performer, and the operator is the supporter. Here it can be observed that the UAV performs 
the required sub-tasks, and the operator would simply need to adjust and verify that it is 
executed appropriately to improve the reliability of the performed action. This graphical 
representation not only aids the visualization of the collaboration between the agents in the 
system, but also supports the dissemination of an overview of the operational workflow to 
other stakeholders. 
2. Data Models (DIV-2 and DIV-3) 
Models to illustrate the types of data flows between the UAV and C2 system should 
also be developed during this stage of the Vee model process. Appendix B also holds 
examples of Logical, and Physical Data models in Figures 20 and 21 which show the 
structures of dataflow, and implementation aspects of the structure in a SAR HMT system 
respectively. These data models are critical as they define the architecture of the software 
aspect of the system, which had yet to be explored earlier in the development process and 
would lead to the derivation of software requirements  
3. UAV Technical Specifications 
Information from the MOEs, MOPs, operational situation and projected operating 
environment was consolidated to determine the required performance characteristics from 
the Supply UAV to ensure that the selected product is capable of meeting or exceeding the 
requirements. Some examples of derived requirements for the generic SAR UAVs are 
shown in Table 12 and would be used to guide designers in their selection of possible 
candidates for UAVs in the SAR HMT system. 
Table 12. Examples of Technical Specifications for Generic UAV. 
Requirement Specification Addresses Need Defined In 
Operating Temperatures 14 to 104oF  POE temperature 
Achievable Wind Resistance 20mph POE wind conditions 
Minimum Operating Range 16 miles OPSIT range 
Minimum Communications Range 8 miles OPSIT range 
IP rating IP65 POE rain and snow conditions 
Achievable Flight Speed 32mph MOE 
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Other parameters that should be considered include maximum flight time, 
sensitivity and range of ground sensing radar, ability to hover at a fixed altitude, GPS 
accuracy and so on. Function-specific UAVs would require an additional array of 
subsystem requirements to dictate the capabilities of the search, communication, and 
delivery functions respectively. 
A Preliminary Design Review (PDR) with all stakeholders should also be 
conducted at this stage before the development proceeds to the Detailed Design phase. The 
objectives of the PDR are to “establish the allocated baseline of hardware, software and 
human/support systems and underlying architectures to ensure that the system under review 
has a reasonable expectation of satisfying the requirements” (AcqNotes 2021b). 
G. DETAILED DESIGN PHASE 
The Detailed Design process delves into the technical specifications required for 
the realization of the system, building upon the operational, functional, and data models 
developed in the earlier phases of the COSEED process. Configuration management is 
especially important here as incremental versions of hardware and software designs would 
be developed iteratively. 
A Critical Design Review (CDR) should be conducted at this stage, with the 
objectives of assessing “a system’s final design as captured in product specifications for 
each Configuration Item in the system’s product baseline and ensures that each 
configuration item has been captured in the detailed design documentation” (AcqNotes 
2021a). 
H. INTEGRATION VERIFICATION AND SYSTEM VALIDATION PHASES 
The established MOEs, MOPs, and identified obstacles to mission success in the 
Needs Assessment phase of the COSEED process would now be used to verify that the 
initial objectives for the system have been achieved. This requires testing to be conducted 
which can be performed in manners such as inspection and analysis, modelling and 
simulation, laboratory testing, and live testing. Each have their own associated benefits and 
tradeoffs which would need to be balanced against test objectives and risks. 
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An overarching Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) should be developed with 
the objective of capturing the test and evaluation activities required for the SAR HMT 
system. These activities would include Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) and 
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) for design verification against technical 
specifications and system validation against stakeholder needs, respectively. These tests 
would ensure that the developed SAR HMT system meets the defined requirements, is 
effective in operations, and suitable for its environment and sustainment needs. 
Developmental Test and Evaluation would begin at the unit level, such as the 
survival pack delivery system components, and gradually expand to cover integrated sub-
systems such as the Supply UAV, and eventually encompass the overall integrated UAS 
system during OT&E, in which the interdependence and workflows between the operators 
and UAS first established in the IA table would be validated and refined in an operational 
environment. 
The Evaluation of Change Process in the Coactive Design Method also calls for the 
implementation of the proposed solutions and subsequent verification of its impact to the 
assigned OPD and interdependency requirements. This is the final step in the iterative 
coactive design method loop and appropriately checks for emergent behavior brought about 
by the introduction of any new solution to the HMT process. 
If any measures or specifications cannot be met throughout any phase of the testing 
processes, the design can be reviewed for technical and process related inadequacies or the 
requirement can be reviewed for relevance. Much like the other phases in the COSEED 
and IA process, the testing phase is part of an iterative loop with the design phases in which 
redesign can be expected to address shortfalls discovered during incremental testing. 
The successful completion of all test activities defined in the TEMP would 
culminate in a Production Readiness Review (PRR) which is the final technical review to 
“evaluate the full, production-configured system to determine if it correctly and completely 




As production units are distributed to end users and the SAR HMT system is 
utilized in a larger variety of scenarios by a broad range of users, system and process 
updates may be required and the IA table should be methodically reviewed following the 
coactive design method starting with the tasks and hierarchical sub-tasks to determine how 
these improvements should be optimally implemented in the HMT UAS system to preserve 
the emphasis of interdependence. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS  
The preceding chapter presented the outcome from the COSEED development 
exercise for a SAR HMT system that strives to produce a solution for an immediate need 
for semi-automated mechanisms in inland SAR operations to reduce reliance on 
conventional manpower intensive resources and while increasing capacity to tackle the 
rising frequency of adverse weather events. This chapter will summarize the key findings 
from the COSEED process development exercise and discuss its strengths over the 
traditional Systems Engineering Vee model. 
A. KEY FINDINGS IN COSEED PROCESS 
This section emphasizes three key findings from the development exercise 
conducted with the COSEED process. While the process largely follows the flow of 
traditional Systems Engineering Vee model, the inclusion of coactive design revealed some 
noteworthy findings. 
1. Coactive Design as an Enabler for HMT Systems Engineering Design 
The Coactive Design Method serves as an effective enabler for HMT system design 
within the systems engineering framework as it promotes the proactive and detailed 
analysis of the tasks that the HMT system is required to execute at the very initial Needs 
Assessment phase in the development process. This attribute helps guide designers towards 
an early understanding of the role the HMT system would play in the overall solution space. 
The subsequent decomposition of each task to its most rudimentary sub-functions 
to evaluate the necessary capacities required for the HMT system serves as a launch point 
into the System Requirements phase. This allowed for the subsequent identification of the 
system’s technical specifications, followed by a review for applicability to the respective 
functions. 
The eventual understanding of potential feasible workflows has direct influence 
over the Detailed Design phase of the interactions and controls interface for the system, 
and any tests for the solution would lead designers back to the IA table to review the 
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capacities and interdependencies in the HMT system, which leads to the next finding from 
the development exercise. 
2. Iterative Nature of COSEED 
The Systems Engineering Vee model implies a somewhat linear process, in which 
the completion of one phase and its corresponding decision gate would allow a seamless 
transition to the next. This however is not the case in many complex engineering programs 
due to varying development timelines for separate sub-components, the ever-changing 
technological landscape and volatile stakeholder requirements. The iterative nature of the 
coactive design method is introduced into the COSEED model, better reflecting the 
realities of system design and requirement management. This should prompt a review of 
the Vee model to capture the iterative element that other systems engineering models have 
highlighted so that those who choose to work with the Vee model are not misguided. 
3. MBSE DODAF Operational Model Improvement 
The operational model in the DoDAF framework focuses on the human element of 
a system, with the OV-5 aspect of the model specifically focusing on the sequential flow 
of information between each other to enable the accomplishment of their respective tasks. 
With the introduction of interdependencies between humans and robots and the notion of 
a robot being a teammate rather than a mere supporting feature, the OV-5 and other 
operational models that were not presented in the study would benefit designers if it also 
incorporated HMT robots into its models as an operational node to reflect the collaborative 
nature of the HMT system more accurately. 
B. PROCESS REVIEW 
With a clear emphasis on understanding the potential interdependencies required 
for an HMT system, the coactive design method serves as a development tool that directs 
designers to consider the human-machine interactions, with little emphasis on other areas. 
To allocate more attention to the technical aspects, the technical specifications required to 
achieve a particular capability or capacity can be specified in the IA table as an additional 
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column. This would assist designers to develop system and subsystem requirements, and 
guide the selection of suitable alternatives for COTS integration.  
In addition, users of the coactive design method stand to benefit from Systems 
Engineering Process inputs which also consider other aspects such as system suitability, 
which include training, reliability, and availability. These factors would equally impact 
how sustainable the system is in the long run. 
Finally, there is a distinct space that coactive design can fill in engineering system 
development as increasingly capable, complex, and automated robotics are infused into 
engineering solutions, by driving the emphasis on human-machine interaction and the 
associated interdependencies to enable more effective HMT solutions that already stand to 
gain from traditional systems engineering principles. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis aimed to propose an integrated Coactive Systems Engineering Design 
(COSEED) approach with the goal of improving integration of HMT systems through the 
use interdependence analysis and MBSE. This was accomplished via a demonstration of a 
development exercise for an HMT system to address a SAR operation scenario using the 
COSEED process, which led to some significant findings. This chapter outlines the 
conclusions from this research and recommendations for future consideration. 
A. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
The results from the COSEED development exercise show that coactive design can 
indeed help to better address the design intricacies and considerations required for HMT 
system development within the systems engineering framework, if the established 
structures can adapt to accommodate the notion that a robot can interact and coordinate its 
actions with a team mate as well as a human can. By accepting this concept, the systems 
engineering framework can be adjusted to update itself and become more compatible with 
future developments in HMT systems. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The insights gained during the development exercise has opened opportunities for 
future research in related fields of Systems Engineering, Coactive Design, and Search and 
Rescue. These are described in the following sections. 
1. Systems Engineering Community 
The prospect of including aspects of interdependence and human-machine 
collaboration when performing HMT system development should be explored and updated 
in the respective SysML and MBSE frameworks to accurately capture the importance of 
encouraging and sustaining teamwork in systems involving the use of automated unmanned 
robots and HMT. One such example was offered in the previous chapter, with the inclusion 
of the HMT robot in the Operational Viewpoint activity model, which was traditionally 
reserved for human-human interactions only. 
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2. Coactive Design Community 
The IA table is an extremely useful tool to guide designers through the coactive 
design method with its methodical and analytical processes. This section describes some 
improvements that can be made to enhance its usability and promote integration with 
systems engineering processes. 
a. IA color scheme 
The IA color scheme presented in Figure 7 offered a technique that made it easy to 
identify the different levels of abilities to perform and support tasks, though it relied on the 
user’s ability to interpret color to be effective. An alternative symbol-based system should 
be explored to allow potential users with color vision deficiencies. Some examples are 
presented in Table 13, each with their own strengths including ease of notation for the 
Numeric category, and uniqueness for the Greek Symbols category. 
Table 13. Non-Color Dependent Alternatives to IA Color Scheme. 
Original Alternatives 
IA Color Scheme Numeric Playing Card Suits Greek Symbols 
 1 ♠ α 
 2 ♣ β 
 3 ♥ δ 
 4 ♦ γ 
 
b. Required technical specifications 
An additional column should be introduced after the Required Capacities column 
for designers to input the required specification for that capacity. This would aid in the 
assessment of the performers and supporters’ abilities to perform and support the sub-task 
respectively.  
An example of this proposal is presented in Table 14 utilizing the Deliver Pack sub-task 
which requires the system to have the capacity to descend to an appropriate altitude for the pack 
to be dropped. An accurate means of altitude detection is required, and a lidar-based solution is 
chosen, with a corresponding range and accuracy requirement determined. Depending on the 
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selected COTS UAV, the designer would then be able to input whether that UAV system would 
be able to perform the task independently or requires assistance and subsequently assess what 
form of assistance the supporting team member could render to the UAV. 
Table 14. IA Table with Proposed Required Specification Column 
Tasks Hierarchical Sub-tasks 
Required 
Capacity Required Specification 








Supplies Deliver Pack 
Reduce Altitude 
to Suitable Height 
for Pack Delivery 
Lidar Range: 10m 
Lidar Accuracy: +/- 5cm 
  
 
3. Search and Rescue Community 
The SAR community has only just begun to exploit unmanned technologies in their 
daily operations, in which the opportunities offered to expand current capacities and reach 
would increase rates of detection which can help save lives. With the COSEED process 
available to promote the holistic development of an optimized SAR HMT system, 
community leaders and workers should be encouraged to explore these new possibilities 
and proactively engage system integrators for innovative and cost-effective solutions. This 
would reduce reliance on and risks to SAR teams and volunteers even as the number of 
natural disasters continue to increase annually, saving more lives in the process. 
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APPENDIX A. IA TABLES 
Table 15. IA Table for Systems Requirements Phase 
Task Hierarchical Sub-tasks Required Capacities 
Deploy for 
Mission 
Onboard Electrical System Functional Check 
Initiate Functional Check Sequence 
Consolidate Inputs from Onboard Sensors 
Analyze Parameters 
Feedback Any Faults 
Determine Go/No-Go for Mission 
Move To Mission Area 
Determine Flight Path 
Analyze Flight Path 
Determine Present Location  
Determine Existing Orientation 
Determine Required Trajectory of Travel 
Execute Flight Functions 
Search for 
Casualties 
Share Media with Operating Base Execute Wireless Transmission Capability 
Scan Area of Interest 
Determine Required Scanning Orientation 
Execute Scanning Function 
Maintain Required Scanning Orientation 
Detect Signs of Life Differentiate Profile of Casualties from Surroundings 
Identify Casualties Differentiate Between Animals and Humans 




Move To Hover Over Casualties 
Assess Casualty Location in Reference to Own 
Determine Orientation and Required Trajectory 
Execute Flight Functions 
Verify Position Above Casualty 
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Task Hierarchical Sub-tasks Required Capacities 
 Send Coordinates to Operating Base 
Determine Own Location 
Broadcast Location to Operating Base 
Capture Location in Database 
Communicate  
with Casualties 
 Move Towards Casualties 
Determine Current and Required Orientation  
Move To Within Minimum Required Distance from Casualty 
Broadcast And Relay Audio Messages 
Receive Media from Operating Base 
Execute Audio Projection Capability 
Execute Audio Capture Capability 
Transmit Media to Operating Base 
Deliver Supplies 
 Move Towards Casualties 
Determine Orientation and Required Trajectory 
Move To Above Casualty 
Verify Position Above Casualty  
Determine Safe Location to Drop Supplies 
Identify Open Spaces Around Casualty 
Determine Area Suitability for Payload Delivery 
Deliver Supplies 
Reduce Altitude to Required Height for Payload Delivery 
Deliver Required Payload 
Health 
Monitoring 
Determine Mission-Abort Low Battery Level 
Criteria 
Monitor Battery Level 
Monitor Distance to Operating Base 
Determine Minimum Battery Level Required to Return to Base 
Determine Abort Mission  
UAV Return  
to Base Move To Base 
Determine Present Location 
Determine Flight Path 
Determine Existing Orientation 
Determine Required Trajectory of Travel 
Execute Flight Functions 
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Table 16. IA Table for Supply UAV in Subsystem Requirement Phase 
Task Hierarchical Sub-tasks Required Capacities 
Team Member Role Alternatives 
Interpretation & OPD Requirements 



















    Only the operator can initiate the functional check sequence as the 
UAV would not know when it is required 
O - operator must be able to see that UAV is ready for functional 
check 
P - UAV must begin sequence when instructed 
D - operator must be able to instruct UAV to begin functional check 
Consolidate Inputs from 
Onboard Sensors 
    Only the UAV can perform this task as it is software driven 
O - operator must be able to see status of functional check 
P - UAV must proceed to next stage automatically 
D - n/a 
Analyze Parameters 
    Both the operator and the UAV can analyze the parameters 
O - operator must be able to see status of functional check 
P - UAV must proceed to next stage automatically 
D - n/a 
Feedback Any Faults 
    Only the UAV can perform this task as it is software driven 
O - operator must be able to see faults 
P - UAV must broadcast fault messages 
D - n/a 
Determine Go/No-Go 
for Mission 
    The UAV can determine go/no-go based on a set of preset criteria, 
but the operator can override that decision if necessary 
O - operator must be able to see final result of functional check 
P - UAV must broadcast assessment result 





Location Via GPS 
    Only the UAV can perform this task as it is software driven 
O - operator must be able to see status and result 
P - UAV must automatically determine location once flight path is 
analyzed 
D - operator must be able to intervene if automatic sequence fails 
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Task Hierarchical Sub-tasks Required Capacities 
Team Member Role Alternatives 
Interpretation & OPD Requirements 









UAV Human Human UAV 
Determine Existing 
Orientation 
    Both the UAV and operator can perform this task 
O - operator must be able to see status and result 
P - UAV must automatically determine orientation once location is 
determined 
D - operator must be able to intervene if automatic sequence fails 
Determine Required 
Trajectory of Travel 
    Both the UAV and operator can perform this task 
O - operator must be able to see status and result 
P - UAV must automatically determine flight trajectory once 
orientation is determined 
D - operator must be able to intervene if automatic sequence fails 
Execute Flight 
Functions 
    Only the UAV can perform this task as it is software driven 
O - operator must be able to see location and status of the UAV in 
real time 
P - UAV must travel to the mission area using the verified route 
D - operator must be able to override controls in event that UAV 






Move To Casualty GPS 
Location 
    Only the UAV can move to the casualty 
O - operator must be able to see location and status of the UAV in 
real time 
P - UAV must travel to the mission area using the verified route 
D - operator must be able to override controls in event that UAV 
defers from flight path 
Confirm Identity of 
Casualties 
    Both the UAV and the operator can contribute to this task to improve 
efficiency 
O - operator must be able to see UAV’ camera view, position, and 
casualty’s GPS tagged location 
P - UAV will automatically orient camera view towards casualty’s 
GPS tagged location 
D - operator must be able to override controls and move UAV to find 
and lock onto casualties 
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Task Hierarchical Sub-tasks Required Capacities 
Team Member Role Alternatives 
Interpretation & OPD Requirements 













    Both the UAV and operator can perform this task 
O - operator must be able to see status and result 
P - UAV must automatically determine flight trajectory once 
orientation is determined 
D - operator must be able to intervene if automatic sequence fails 
Move To Above 
Casualty 
    Only the UAV can perform this task as it is software driven 
O - operator must be able to see location and status of the UAV in 
real time 
P - UAV must travel to within a required distance to allow clear 
audio communication 
D - operator must be able to override controls in event that UAV 
defers from flight path 
Verify Position Above 
Casualty Using Camera 
    Both the UAV and operator can perform this task 
O - operator must be able to see UAV status 
P - UAV must hover over casualty and hold position 







Identify Open Spaces 
Around Casualty 
    The UAV is required to relay images of the area to the operator 
O - operator must be able to see media image 
P - n/a 
D - operator must be able to override controls in event that UAV is 
unable to identify suitable drop site 
Determine Area 
Suitability for Pack 
Delivery 
    The operator must assist in this step  
O - operator must be able access media 
P - UAV must move nearer to open spaces for verification 
D - operator must be able to override UAV controls and move UAV 
and fix camera on required FOV 
Select Area for 
Delivery 
    The operator must assist in this step  
O – n/a 
P – n/a 
D - operator must be able to select area  
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Task Hierarchical Sub-tasks Required Capacities 
Team Member Role Alternatives 
Interpretation & OPD Requirements 









UAV Human Human UAV 
 Select Pack for Delivery 
    Only the UAV can perform this task. Assume UAV will select next 
available pack for delivery 
O - operator must be able to see that a particular pack has been 
selected for delivery 
P - UAV must automatically prepare a pack for delivery 
D - operator must be able to override controls in event that UAV is 
unable to select pack 
Deliver 
Supplies 
Reduce Altitude to 
Suitable Height for 
Pack Delivery 
    Only the UAV can perform this task, but the operator can ensure that 
it is close enough for safe and successful delivery 
O - operator must be able to see UAV position (incl. altitude) and 
status 
P - UAV must automatically descend to and maintain appropriate 
altitude for payload drop 
D - operator must be able to override controls in event that UAV is 
unable to descend/hover sufficiently 
Deliver Required Pack 
    Only the UAV can perform this task 
O - operator must be able to see UAV position (incl. altitude) and 
status 
P - UAV must automatically drop payload when required 
D - operator must be able to override controls in event that UAV is 
unable to drop payload 
 Verify Pack Delivery 
    The UAV can perform this electronically, or the operator can verify 
visually 
O – operator must be able to see payload status 
P – UAV should deliver pack when required 








Monitor Battery Level 
    Both the UAV and operator can perform this task, but the UAV 
would be more efficient 
O - operator must be able to see UAV battery level 
P - n/a 
D - n/a 
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Task Hierarchical Sub-tasks Required Capacities 
Team Member Role Alternatives 
Interpretation & OPD Requirements 









UAV Human Human UAV 
Level 
Criteria Monitor Distance to 
Operating Base 
    Both the UAV and operator can perform this task, but the UAV 
would be more efficient 
O - operator must be able to see UAV position 
P - n/a 
D - n/a 
Determine Minimum 
Battery Level Required 
to Return to Base 
    Both the UAV and operator can perform this task, but the UAV 
would be more efficient 
O - operator must be able to see UAV position 
P - n/a 
D - n/a 
Determine Abort 
Mission  
    Both the UAV and operator can perform this task, but the UAV 
would be more efficient 
O - operator must be able to see UAV decision to abort mission 
P - UAV must automatically initiate abort mission when battery level 
reaches threshold level 
D - operator must be able to override and initiate abort mission if 







Location Via GPS 
    Only the UAV can perform this task as it is software driven 
O - operator must be able to see status and result 
P - UAV must automatically determine location once flight path is 
analyzed 
D - operator must be able to intervene if automatic sequence fails 
Determine Flight Path 
    Both can perform this task, as only a straight-line path is required 
O - operator must see flight path that UAV has plotted 
P - UAV must set shortest possible path 




    Both the UAV and operator can perform this task 
O - operator must be able to see status and result 
P - UAV must automatically determine orientation once location is 
determined 
D - operator must be able to intervene if automatic sequence fails 
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Task Hierarchical Sub-tasks Required Capacities 
Team Member Role Alternatives 
Interpretation & OPD Requirements 









UAV Human Human UAV 
Determine Required 
Trajectory of Travel 
    Both the UAV and operator can perform this task 
O - operator must be able to see status and result 
P - UAV must automatically determine flight trajectory once 
orientation is determined 
D - operator must be able to intervene if automatic sequence fails 
Execute Flight 
Functions 
    Only the UAV can move to the required location 
O - operator must be able to see location and status of the UAV in 
real time 
P - UAV must travel to base using the planned route 
D - operator must be able to override controls in event that UAV 
defers from flight path 
69 
APPENDIX B. DODAF VIEWPOINT DIAGRAMS 
 
Figure 16. OV-5 Activity EFFBD for SAR HMT System 
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Figure 17. SV-4 Hierarchy Block Definition Diagram for SAR HMT UAS 
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Figure 18. SV-4 Hierarchy Block Definition Diagram for SAR HMT UAV 
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Figure 19. SV-5 Traceability Matrix for SAR HMT UAS
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Figure 20. DIV-2 Model Sample. Source: Andrianova (2015a). 
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